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I. Capital Inflows to Latin America 
Leonardo Leiderman and Carmen Reinhartl 
Introduction 
There has been a remarkable resurgence of  international capital 
flows to Latin American countries. In the four years 1990-1993, these 
countries have received a net capital inflow of $166 billion. This 
represents a major change from the previous decade, when there 
was a debt crisis and little capital flowed to  Latin American nations. 
In fact, there has been a reentry of international capital flows to  
developing countries in other regions (such as Asia and the Middle 
East) as well. In the case of Latin America, both impo'rtant external 
and internal factors have played a role in the sharp rise in capital 
inflows, which in turn have been accompanied by a renewal of 
economic growth. 
Capital inflows are not an unmitigated blessing for the receiving 
region or  country; in fact, they may pose serious dilemmas lor 
economic policy. Large capital inflows are often associated with 
money and credit expansion, inflationary pressures, a real exchange 
rate appreciation, and a deterioration in the current account of the 
balance of payments. In addition, the history of Latin America 
provides ample evidence that massive capital inflows may also have 
strong impacts on the stock market, the real estate market, and the 
money market-impacts which may well threaten tbe stability of 
these markets and of the financial system as a whole. If the capital 
inflows are of a purely short-term nature, these problems intensify, 
as the probability of an abrupt and sudden reversal increases. 
Accordingly, the design of effective economic policies for dealing 
with these capital inflows, and for ensuring their durability, is one 
of the key economic policy issues a t  the present time. 
In this paper we discuss the principal facts, developments, and 
policigs under the current episode of capital inflows to  Latin America, 
as well as their implications for sustainability of the inflows. In 
particular, we deal with policy priorities that could ensure the 
persistence of these flows, as far as possible. The analysis draws 
heavily on previous work by Galvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1992, 
and 1993a,b,c) which used data for ten Latin American countries 
and eight Asian c o ~ ~ n t r i e s . ~  The paper is organized as follows. 
Section EI describes the main characteristics of capital inflows to  the 
Latin American region. Section III discusses the important role of 
external factors in the present inflows episode. Various observed 
policy responses to  the capital inflows are discussed in Section IV. 
Last, Section V deals with factors that will determine the durability 
of the capital inflows phenomenon. 
Capital Inflows: Main Characteristics 
Some basic concepts 
Capital inflows are defined as the increase in net international 
indebtedness of the private and the public sectors during a given 
period of time, and are measured-albeit imprecisely-by the s~lrplus 
in the capital account of the balance of payments. Therefore, except 
for errors and omissions, the capital account surplus ecluals the 
excess of expenditure over income (which, in turn, is equal to the 
gap between national investment and national saving) plus the 
change in official holdings of international reserves. Thus, increases 
in capital r'rt flozus can bc identified with larger current account deficits 
and/or reserve accumulation. 
The central bank of the receiving economy could react to increased 
capital inflows in various ways, depending mainly on the prevailing 
exchange rate regime, Under a pure float, the increased net exports 
of assets in the capital account are financing an increase in net 
imports of goods anci services. In this case there is no foreign 
exchange market intervention by the authorities, and the inflows of 
capital from abroad would not be associated with changes in central 
banks' holdings of official reserves. At the other extreme, the domestic 
authorities actively intervene to maintain a fixed exchange rate. In 
the presence of a capital inflow, they would purchase the foreign 
exchange that flows in, and the increase in the capital account 
surplus would be assgciated with an increase in official reserves. 
Table 2 presents a breakdown of Latin America's balance of payments 
into its three main accounts. The capital inflows under consideration 
appear in the form of surpluses in the capital account, of about $23 
billion in 1990, about $39 billion in 199 1, $59 billion in 1992, and $44 
billion in 1993. Part of the increased capital inflows represent 
repatriation of previous flight capital, but there are also new investors 
in Latin A r n e r i ~ a . ~  A substantial fraction of the inflows (i.e., 40 
percent) has been channeled to reserves, which increased by about 
$65 billion in the last four years. Interestingly, the extent of reserves' 
accumulation out  of a given capital inflow has decreased over the 
years. This probably reflects the fact tbat at  the start of the present 
capital inflows episode (i.e., after the debt crisis) there were relatively 
low levels of international reserves, and tbat most central banks 
used the initial inflows to build up their reserves. Overall, the sharp 
illcrease in official reserves il~dlcates that the capital inflow was met 
with a rather heavy degree of foreign exchange market intervention 
by the monetary authorities in the region. Figure 1, which depicts 
monthly data on international reserves for the ten countries in our 
sample, shows that for most of the countries there is a pronounced 
upward trend in the stock of official reserves starting from about 
the first half of 1990. 
The rest (i.e., 60 percent) of the capital inflows helped to 
finance a marked increase in the region's current account deficit- 
that is, an increased gap between national investment and national 
saving. In some countries, such as Chile and Mexico, an  important 
part of the inflows has financed increases in private investment; yet, 
in others (such as Argentina) there has been a marked rise in private 
consumption. Thus, whether increased current account defiiits have 
been associated with increased investment or reduced saving is 
mainly a country-specific matter. 
Latin America has not been the only region receiving sizable 
capital inflows in recent years. In effect, capital began to flow to 
Thailand in 1988 and to  a broader number of Asian countries in 
1989-1990 (see Bercuson and Koenig (1993), Calvo, Leiderman, and 
Figure 1. Latin America: Total Reserves Minus Gold 
January 198&November 1993 
(billions of U.S. dollars) 
COLOMBIA 
8 
7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
ECUADOR 
1.1 , I 
24 
3 4 
PERU 
3.2 
22 J 
20 2 8 .6 
18 2.4 
16 2 2 
14 1 I3 
12 r 13 1 4  
10 1 2  
8 1 
e 0 8 .6 
4 
Jal-84 Jsn-88 Jan-90 Jan-91 Jan-92 Jan-93 0.4 Jan-84 Jan-HI) Jan-XI Jan-91 Jan-92 Jan-93 
0.9 1 URUGUAY VENEZUELA I 1 1 1  
" " I  I > I  I 
" G 
. j ~ n  84 Jan-88 Jan-0 Jan-91 Jan-ST Jan-93 Jan-84 Jan-88 Jan-90 Jan-91 Jan-92 Jan-93 
Source: international Financial Statistics, IMF 
Reinhart (1993b), and Chuhan, Claessens and Mamingi (1993)). As 
Table 2 shows, capital inflows amounted to $150 billion during the 
1990-93 period. The inflows were met with a heavy degree of 
fareign exchange market intervention: 75 percent of the inflows 
resulted in accumulation of official international reserves. 
As far as their compositioil is concerned, the capital inflows of 
the 1990s have a radically different pattern from that of earlier 
periods. Commercial bank loans, which dominated the earlier period, 
have been replaced by foreign direct investment and by bond and 
equity portfolio flows-a change that is also evident for developing 
countries as a whole (see Figure 2). According to IMF data, uninsured 
medium- and long-term loan comnlitnlents to  the region amounted 
to only $0.9 billion in 1992 and to  $0.5 billion in the first five months 
of 1993. 
In contrast to the limited use of syndicated bank credit, Latin 
American countries have become the main borrower in the 
international bond market, raising $12.4 billion in 1992 and $11.2 
billion during the first half of 1993. Mexico has been the leading 
Latin American borrower. It raised about $6 billion in 1992 and a 
similar amount in the first half of 1993. In the Iast two years, 
Brazilian entities have raised considerable amounts as well (see 
Table 3) .  Terms on new issues have continued to exhibit considerable 
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spreads, and these have been reflected in spreads in the secondary 
market for Latin American bonds, as shown in Figure 3 .  
Issuance of international equity by Latin American companies 
has shown a lower level of activity. It amounted to $4.1 billion in 
1992 and to $2.6 billion in the first half of 2993. In particular, Mexico 
has issued about $7 billion in 1930-93 in international equity, followecl 
by Argentina, which issued about $3 billion at  the same time (see 
Table 3).  At the same time, direct equity portfolio purchases on local 
stock markets, especially by inst i t~~t ional  investors, have become 
the most important channel for equity inflows into various emerging- 
market countries. In recent years, total returns in Latin American 
stock markets have been considerably higher than in the U.S. and 
other industrialized countries (see Figure 4). International investors 
have viewed Latin America as fertile ground for raising their expected 
returns, In addition, international investors have shown increasing 
interest in fixed income instruments denominated in local currency. 
The leading example in this area are holdings of CETES (Mexican 
Figure 4. Share Prices for Selected Emerging 
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treasury bills) outside Mexico, which have reached approximately 
$20 billion at the end of 1993. 
There has been a marked increase in the relative importance of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to  Latin America. They 
constitute now about 25 percent of total capital inflows, compared 
to about 10 percent in the late 1970s. Again, this reflects an overall 
trend in global foreign investment going to  developing countries. It 
is well known that foreign direct investment is guided by more 
medium- or long-term profitability considerations than portfolio 
investments, and hence it is probably subject to a smaller degree of 
sudden reversals than the latter. Moreover, FDI flows c6uld have 
positive externalities for the receiving economy such as increased 
access to foreign markets, and increased scope for human capital 
development and for introduction of top-of-the-line technology. 
The United States has been the main source of FDI in Latin America, 
and the investment flows have been directed mainly to service 
sectors such as transport, telecommunications, and banking. Among 
various countries, FDI has been of greatest importance (relative to 
total capital inflows) in Chile, and of increasingly lower importance 
in Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil. 
Macroeconomic effec2is 
In discussing the macroeconomic effects of capital inflows to Latin 
America it is useful to  compare these against the Asian experience. 
First, as Table 4 illustrates, the swing in the balance on the capital 
account k s  a percent of GDP) is of a similar order of magnitude for 
the countries under study in the two regions. For the Latin American 
countries in our sample, the change in the capital account amounts 
to  4 percent of GDP; for the Asian countries the capital account 
surplus increases by 2.7 percent of GDP. Second, as discussed, 
capital inflows have been associated with increased current account 
deficits and with a marked accumulation of internationa1 reserves. 
Third, during the early phases of the surge in capital inflows there 
are sharp increases in stock prices. Then, share price indices decreased 
during 1992, and a strong recovery was observed from late 1992 
onward. Share price indices for selected Latin American and Asian 
emerging markets were higher (in U.S. dollar terms) a t  the end of 
1993 than at  the time of renewal of capital inflows to these regions 
(see Figure 4). Fourth, capital inflows have been accompanied by an 
acceleration in economic growth. 
As shown in Figure 5, in most Latin American countries capital 
inflows have been associated with considerable real exchange rate 
appreciation4, yet in Asia such an appreciation is less common. 
While the reasons for these differences in the response of the real 
exchange rate are likely to  be numerous, important differences in 
the composition of aggregate demand may play a key role in 
determining whether the real exchange rate appreciates or not. As 
Table 4 summarizes, for the Asian countries investment as a share 
of GDP increases by about 3.5 percentage points during the capital 
inflows period, but the investment ratio remained stagnant for the 
Latin American region (though here there are marked differences 
across countries5). In fact, for the Latin American region the inflows 
during 1990-93 are primarily associated with a decline in private 
saving and higher c~nsu rnp t i on .~  If the increased investment (in 
Asia) is tilted more toward imported capital goods, and the increased 
consumption (in Latin America) has an imported domestic component, 
other things equal, this would work in the direction of generating 
stronger real exchange rate depreciation in Latin America. The 
behavior of public-sector consumption is another element influencing 
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inflows after they have produced high yields and before the collapse 
of these policy programs. 
Several factors and underlying trends interacted in the late 
3980s to make Latin America a potentially fertile territory for the 
renewal of capital inflows from abroad. First, there was a steep 
acceleration in the trends of institutionalization, globalization, and 
international diversification of investments in North Anlerica and 
other financial centers. This transformation is seen in the increasing 
amounts of funds being managed by mutual funds, pension funds, 
and life insurance companies. These entities began to attempt to 
raise expected returns and/or reduce overall risks by taking advantage 
of investments in emerging markets. Since the total assets of 
institutional investors are very large7, even relatively tiny portfolio 
shifts consisting of flows of capital to emerging markets can constitute 
sizable capital inflows for the receiving areas. In addition, regulatory 
changes in the United States have made it easier for foreign private 
issuers of equity to place their issues under more attractive conditions 
to investors. 
Second, several countries in the Latin American region made 
significant progress toward normalizing relations with existing 
external creditors and reducing concerns about debt overhang. This 
included reaching agreements with creditors for debt restructurings, 
such as Brady-type operations. 
Third, several countries began to  adopt sound monetary and 
fiscal policies in the context of major disinflation plans as well as 
market-oriented structural reforms. Fourth, the existence of a large 
pool of Latin American flight capital in foreign markets (mainly in 
the U.S.) certainly facilitated the re-entry of capital to the region, 
including through the new opportunities created by the extensive 
privatization programs that were undertaken. All these underlying 
factors contributed to re-establish Latin American credibility with 
foreign investors and provided the necessary conditions for the 
potential return of external capital to the region. Beyond these 
trends, key external factors in the present capital inflows episode 
are the unusually low interest rates that prevailed in the United 
States for the last four years. These low rates, combined with the 
persistent recessions in most industrialized countries, have attracted 
investors to the high investment yields, and improving economic 
prospects, of developing economies such as in I,atin America. Low 
world interest rates have also improved creditworthiness indicators 
for various individual countries, especially those with considerable 
debt-service oblisations. 
Available empirical evidence for ten Latin American countries 
indicates that foreign factors have played an important role in the 
most recent episode; Calvo, Leiderrnan, and Reinhart (1993a) find 
that foreign factors accounted for 30 to 60 percent of the variance in 
real exchange rates anh reserves, depending on the country. Similarly, 
Chuhan, Claessens, and Mamingi (1993) find that external factors 
explain about half of the bond and equity flows from the United 
States to a panel of six Latin American countries. Their results also 
indicate that while foreign factors also played a significant role in 
stimulating bond and equity flows to  several Asian countries (a  
panel of seven countries was used in the study), external developments 
were much less important than domestic factors in that region. The 
findings by Fernandez-Arias (1993)-who used a panel of thirteen 
middle-income developing countries receiving portfolio flows after 
1988-indicate that external factors per se had a substantial impact 
on country creditworthiness indicators. 
Our emphasis on the role of external factors does not imply that 
domestic factors, such as structural reforms and stabilization, have 
been of negligible importance. As discussed above, domestic policies 
have been part of the necessary conditions (i.e., prerequisites) for 
the reentry of international capital. However, and leaving aside the 
foregoing empirical evidence, domestic factors alone cannot explain 
why capital inflows have occurred in countries that have not 
undertaken reforms and have not stabilized or why they did not 
occur, until only recently, in countries where reforms were introduced 
well before 1930. A partial role played by domestic factors in 
attracting capital from abroad is evident in the marked differences 
across countries in the orders of magnititdes of the capital inflows. 
For example, Argentina, Chile, and Mexico (countries with important 
domestic reforms and disinflation) have attracted capital in orders 
of magnitudes well in excess of those recorded for other countries in 
the region. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, foreign direct investment 
has been most pronounced in those countries that were well advanced 
in their market-oriented reforms and stabilization. 
Policy Response 
The appropriate policy response to  capital inflows clearly depends 
on the expected durability of the inflows, the availability and flexibility 
of various policy instruments, and the nature of domestic financial 
markets. In addition, the prevailing policy environment-e.g., whether 
or not an inflation stabilization plan is being implemented-and the 
extent of policymakers\redibility are key determinants of the form 
and timing of the appropriate policy response. 
The rationale for policy intervention emerges from the main 
concerns of policymakers: capital inflows can lead to  inflationary 
pressures, real exchange rate appreciation and loss of competitiveness, 
and a deterioration of the current account. In addition, the inflows 
can have a destabilizing impact on domestic financial markets. 
These concerns have often led the authorities to  react to the capital 
inflows by implementing a broad variety of policy measures. The 
remainder of this section examines the role of some of those policies. 
Monetary alzd Exchange Rate Policy 
Greater exchange rate flexibility. A capital-receiving country may 
opt to let the nominal exchange rate appreciate in response to a 
capital inflow. This option has three main virtues. First, it insulates 
the money supply, domestic credit, and more generally, the banking 
system from the inflows. Second, because of a pass-through from 
the exchange rate to prices it may help reduce inflation-precisely 
at  a time that achieving disinflation is high on the policymaker's 
agenda. Third, allowing the exchange rate to fluctuate introduces 
some uncertainty that may well d i sco~~rage  some of the purely 
speculative (and highly reversible) inflows. The main disadvantage 
of a pure float is that massive capital inflows may induce a steep 
nominal and real appreciation of the domestic currency, which, in 
turn, may damage strategic sectors of the economy, like nontraditional 
exports. This is clearly the case if the real appreciation is persistent. 
But, even when the latter does not hold, the greater real exchange 
rate volatility per se nlay have negative effects on tradable-goods 
sectors, to the extent that financial markets do  not provide enough 
instruments to hedge against such uncertainty. 
There has been wide cross-country differences in the degree of 
exchange rate flexibility in the present episode. However, the common 
ground appears to be that all central banks intervene in the foreign 
exchange market to some degree and no country has operated under 
a free float. Chile and Mexico are among those that have allowed 
some degree of exchange rate flexibility in the context of their 
exchange rate bands. Both these countries have widened their bands, 
and especially in Chile the exchange rate has been allowed to 
extensively fluctuate within the band (Figure 6)."imilarly, other 
countries, such as Colombia, have allowed for some appreciation of 
the nominal exchange rate. As indicated, one advantage of allowing 
Figure 6. Chile: The Exchange Rate 
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nominal exchange rate appreciation is that to the extent that market 
fundamentals call for a real exchange rate appreciation, the latter 
can be effected all a t  once through the nominal appreciation of the 
exchange rate, rather than gradually through increases in domestic 
inflation. 
Sterilized versus nonsterilized intervention. Having decided to 
intervene in the foreign exchange market, the next policy question 
is whether such intervention should be sterilized or not. Sterilization- 
i.e., the exchange of bonds for foreign exchange-can help attenuate 
the impact of capital inflows on money and credit. Curtailing the 
growth on the monetary aggregates may be desirable for a variety 
of reasons: As the availability of credit increases, the quality of the 
loans made may well decline, placing the banking system at higher 
risk; a too rapid expansion may lead to "overheating" of the economy 
and fuel inflationary pressures; if the monetary authorities have 
announced monetary targets, growth in excess of those targets may 
damage their credibility. 
However, a t  a minimum, sterilized intervention will keep 
domestic interest rates above what they would have been in the 
absence of sterilization. At worst, this measure may well raise 
domestic interest rates and provide incentives for further inflows. 
In addition, sterilization results in an increase in the public debt and 
\ it entails quasi-fiscal costs to  the extent that the interest rate on 
domestic bonds is higher than that on foreign exchange reserves. 
Annual estimates of these costs in Latin American countries range 
from 0.25 to 0.50 percent of GDP. The cross-country evidence reveals 
that sterilized intervention (in varying orders of magnitude) has 
been the most coinrnon policy response to  capital inflows in both 
Latin America and Asia. 
Nonsterilized intervention may be desirable if there is a perceived 
increase in the demand for money (due to, for example, a successful 
inflation stabilization program), which the authorities wish to 
accommodate. Under those circumstances, rapid monetary growth 
is not necessarily inflationary and no quasi-fiscal burdens are 
generated. However, nonsterilized intervention, as noted, runs the 
risk of increasing the vulnerability of the financiaf system, especially 
if these is a system of explicit (or implicit) deposit insurance and 
banking supervision is poor.  From an overall macroeconomic 
perspective, such an option becomes more attractive the smaller the 
capabilities (or willingness) of the banking system to increase loans 
to  the private sector. As we approach the limiting case, in which the 
banking system is unable to intermediate more funds, additional 
capital ii~flows through the banking system will exert a strong 
downward pressure on interest rates, slowing down the pace of 
inflows and lowering the fiscal cost of the outstanding domestic 
credit. However, this is not the case in most of the Latin American 
countries. 
Reserve requirements. A viable policy option that limits the expansion 
of money and credit associated with the surge in  capital illflows is 
to  increase bank reserve requirenients and curtailing access to 
rediscount facilities. This would be especially relevant in those 
countries where capital inflows have taken the form of substantial 
increases in local bank accounts. An increase in marginal reserve 
requirements (an option used by CI~ile and Malaysia), clearly lowers 
the capacity of banks to lend, thus diminishing some of the risks 
associated with nonsterilized intervention. Further, no Quasi-fiscal 
costs are incurred. A drawback of this reserve-requirement policy is 
that over time it may promote disintermediation, as new institutions 
may develop so as to  bypass these regulations. Eventually those 
institutions could grow so Iarge that they end up being under the 
insurance umbrella of the central bank (by the principle that they 
are "too large to fail"), recreating all the potential problems associated 
with nonsterilized intervention. Therefore, increasing rnarginaI reserve 
requirements is unlikely to be effective beyond the short run. Moreover, 
increasing bank reserve requirements amounts to a reversal of the 
underlying trends of financial liberalization in developing countries, 
which have recently resulted in sharp reductions in these requirements, 
and their convergence toward levels observed in industrial countries. 
I i 
Banking regulation and supervision. A major concern about the 
intermediation of international capital flows through the domestic 
banking system is that individual banks are subject to free or 
subsidized deposit insurance; i.e., there is an implicit commitment 
by the authorities that banks-especially those of large 'size--will 
not be allowed to fail. It is well known that free implicit deposit 
insurance induces banks to  increase their risk exposure. In several 
countries, there has been a sharp expansion of bank loans to finance 
private consumption. There is evidence that in some of these countries 
the percentage of nonperforming loans has recently increased over 
time. In addition, banks may pay little attention to the matching of 
the maturities of deposits against those for loans-the former being 
typically shorter than the latter. Similarly, there could be a mismatch 
between the currency denomination of bank loans and the currency 
denomination of profits and incomes of the borrowing sector; e.g., 
consider the producer of a nontradable commodity borrowing in 
U.S. dollars to finance his activity. All these factors increase the 
vulnerability of the financial system to reversals in capital flows- 
reversals that have the potential to end in financial crises. 
I t  is the role of bank reg~~la t ion  and supervision to effectively 
diminish some of these risks. As discussed earlier, attempting to 
insulate the banking system from short-term capital flows is a 
particularly important goal in cases where a substantial proportion 
of the inflows are in the form of short-term bank deposits. Regulation 
that limits the exposure of banks to the volatility in equity and real 
estate markets could help insulate the banking system from the 
potential bubbles associated with sizable capital inflows. In this 
vein, risk-based capital requirements in conjunction with adequate 
banking supervision to insure s~ l ch  requirements are complied with 
could kelp insulate the domestic banking system from the vagaries 
of capital flows. 
Fiscal policy 
Taxing short-term inflows. Taxes on short-term borrowing abroad 
were imposed in some countries-Israel in 1978 and Chile in 1991 
and 1992. This policy conveys the message that the authorities are 
concerned with the short-tern~ (potentially speculative) inflows. 
Such policies can coexist with policies that encourage a different 
type of inflow, specifically foreign direct investment. Unlike other 
measures, it attacks the problem at the source. However, although 
this form of intervention could be effective in the short run, experience 
suggests that the private sector is quick in finding ways to dodge 
those taxes through over- and under-invoicing of imports and exports 
and increased reliance on parallel financial and foreign exchange 
markets. Further, initial conditions are not always conducive to 
implementing a policy that adds barriers to international capital 
movements. If a stabilization/adjustme11t program was recently 
undertake11 and the authorities enjoy less than full credibility, the 
imposition of any capital account barrier may be interpreted as a 
signal that policies are reverting, and thus potentially undermine 
the success of the program. 
Fiscal tightening. Another policy reaction to  capital inflows has 
beell to tighten fiscal policy; the clearest example of this policy is 
Thailand. The idea is to impose fiscal restraint, especially in the 
form of spending cuts on nontradables, so as to lower aggregate 
demai~d and curb the inflationary impact of capital inflows. Lower 
government expenditure on nontraded goods and services could 
have a direct impact on aggregate demand, which is unlikely to be 
offset by an expansion of private sector demand. However, contraction 
of government expenditure is always a sensitive political issue and 
it can not be undertaken on short notice, such delays increase the 
risk that, ex post, the policy is procyclical. 
Further, fiscal policy is usually set on the basis of medium- or  
long-term considerations rather than in response to what may turn 
out to be short-term fluctuations in international capital flows. 
Tbailand provides a timely example of this policy dilemma. Tl-re 
combination of booming growth and the substantive fiscal restraint 
of the past few years have generated a perceived need to improve 
the current infrastructure (which is no longer adequate if rapid 
growth is to he sustained). At the same time, the pressures on the 
real exchange rate that accompany the surge in inflows would 
warrant fiscal restraint. However, in cases where the authorities 
had envisioned a tightening of the fiscal stance, the presence of 
capital inflow may call for earlier and, perhaps, more aggressive 
action in this respect. 
Stractural measures 
Various countries have adopted structural measures to directly or 
indirectly diminish the size of or the potential adverse effects of 
capital inflows. In sevkral of the Asian and Latin American countries 
capital account liberalization has either been undertaken already or  
is under consideration. The general principle has often been that by 
allowing domestic agents to hold foreign assets, some offsetting 
capital outflow is generated following the li beralization. However, 
the net impact of these measures on the capital account are, thus far, 
not conclusive. In some cases, as the recent experience of Colombia 
highlights, the liberalization measures increased the confidence of 
foreign investors and in so doing further stimulated inflows. There 
are also examples where the presence of capital inflows and the 
stronger economic activity were used to implement a more rapid 
pace of trade liberalization and of domestic financial reforms. While 
the trend is toward integrated goods and capital markets, in some 
countries there have been pressures for higher export subsidies to 
mitigate the effects of a sustained real exchange rate appreciation, a 
policy that is known to result in substantial fiscal costs and in 
deeper economic distortions. With regard to  structural policies, it 
appears these should be designed so as to be consistent with Longer- 
term objectives. 
The bottom line 
A reasonable sequencing of policies .tvould consist of initially limiting 
the intermediation of those flows-hy sterilized intervention, greater 
exchange rate flexibility, and/or increasing marginal reserve 
requirements. This could be followed by a gradual monetization of 
these flows (i.e. nonsterilized intervention), accompanied perhaps 
by an appreciation of the currency. The step to  nonsterilized 
intervention, though, could be speeded up if credit availability is 
limited and/or if the quasi-fiscal costs are high, and if the implied 
creation of credit ancl nioney does not constitute a strong force 
toward an acceleration o f  inflation. 
Durability of the Capital Inflows 
Will external and internal developments combine to make the flows 
of capital into Latin America durable? Part of the answer to this 
quest ion depends on the continuation of underlying trends in the 
international financial system: the globalization of markets and the 
diversification of investment portfolios. The growing interest of 
institutional investors in Latin American (and other emerging) markets 
is likely to continue, in what could be a large portfolio shift to be 
effected tlzroughout ~ l z e  rest of the 2990s. The movement of 
international capital into Latin America has been based not only on 
high expected returns, but also on the idea that diversification can 
reduce the overall risk in portfofios. The result is that Latin American 
securities are increasingly sold in the United States, as well as in 
European and Asian markets. As time passed, the reliance of individual 
countries on returning flight capital has been reduced and a broader 
invcstor base has been achieved. There is a growing trend in the 
area toward reaching regional 'trade agreements. Various countries 
have expressed their interest in following the lead of Mexico and 
joining the NAFTA in the near future. This trend is likely to encourage 
further flows of FDI (foreign direct investment) into Latin America. 
Yet, other factors work in the opposite direction. In particular, 
the present global environment of low interest rates and weak 
activity in the irtdustrial countries is likely to  change. As a global 
recovery progresses, international interest rates may increase and 
capital market colldltions may tighten. Further, new competitors 
are likely to emerge as economic and political conditions in eastern 
Europe and the FSU and other parts of tile world improve. Such 
developments raise the possibility of reversals-especially in the 
most "'buhb1y9' markets and in those countries where the inflows are 
mostly of a short-term nature. In the face of heavy sales of domestic 
sccu;ities by foreign investors the liquidity of financial markets in 
various countries would be put to  a test. However, it is eizcouraging 
for the countries in the region that their markets dealt reasoilably 
well with the financial volatility observed in 1992. The market 
optimism (and possibly price overshooting) in the early part of 1992 
was offset by turbulence in the remainder of the year---turbulence 
that was reflected in a drop in share prices of about 30 percent in 
U.S. dollars; see Figure 4. The fact that the market mechanism 
worked well against this volatility, in what otherwise could have 
been an abrupt disruption of the market, certainly coatributed to 
sustain an increasing influx of new investors to  the region. 
Dut-abifity also depends on internal factors. Sound macroeconomic 
policies, a strong commitment to market-oriented reforms, and 
outward-oriented trade strategies are likely to  enhance the credibility 
of a given country's policymakers from the standpoint of international 
investors. Economically, countries make the must efficient use of 
capital inflaws if the return on investment of these resources is 
higher than their cost. Policies that promote high domestic saving 
and adequate returns on domestic investment would be beneficial 
in this context. As noted earlier, in some countries, the financial 
intermediation of capital inflows is a source of concern. For the 
individual investor, thk possibilities for hedging against these risks 
are certainly limited in developing countries. Under these conditions, 
it is necessary to ensure an adequate regulation and supervision of 
the banking system to  avoid currency or  term-structure mismatches 
and excessive credit creation which could damage the ability of the 
financial system to  deal. with a reversal of capital flows. 
Last, it seems essential for countries to have flexible policy 
instruments that can respond quickly to  adverse events. Holding an 
adequate level of reserves, and allowing for some degree of exchange 
rate flexibility (e.g. through an exchange rate band) can work in this 
direction. 
Table 1. Latin America: Balance of Payments 
(1 985-93) 
Balance of goods, services, Balance on capital account plus Changes in 
reserves*"* Year- .- a 4  private transfers" _ _ _ _- neJt_e~o:~&nd_om@.sions*~ -_ - - - --- 
-- - $-B%on--- $ Billion $ Billion 
($1 (2) 
* Data for Westem Hemisphere from IMF's World Economic Outlook. 
** A minus sign indicates a deficit in the pertinent account. Balance on goods, services, and private transfefi is 
equal to the current account balance less official transfers. The latter are treated in this table as external financing 
and are included in the capital account. 
*** A minus sign indicates an increase. 
Table 2. Asia: Balance of Payments 
(1 985-92) 
Balance of goods, services, Balance on capital account plus Changes in 
-- 
net errors and omissions** reserves"** Year a n d c ! ' a t e s _ l t  $ Billion $ Billion $  illi ion---- 
1985 
(1) 
-16.6 
(2) 
19.5 -2.9 
1986 0.9 22.7 -23.5 
1987 17.9 23.3 -41.3 
1988 5.7 5.9 -1 1.6 
1989 -2.6 12.3 -9.6 
1990 -5.8 29.2 -23.5 
1991 -4.7 46.3 -41.5 
1992 -8.2 30.1 -21.9 
1993 -24.0 45.0 
"- -..- .-. - - - .- - .. -- - -21 ,(1_ ._. 
* Data for Asia from IMFs Wortd Economic Outbook. 
*" A minus sign indicates a deficit in the pertinent account. Balance on goods, services, and private transfers is equal to 
the current account baiance less onicial transfers. The latter are treated in this table as external financing and are 
included in the capital account. 
"' A minus sign indicates an increase. 
Table 3. Bond and Equity Issues 
(1 989- First Half 1993) 
International Bond i s s u e s  -. - 
Western Hemisphere 833 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Mexico 570 
Panama 
Trinidad y Tobago -- 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 263 
International -igu~sueu - - 
- -- -- - 
Western Hemisphere 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Mexico 
Panama 
Venezuela 
Sources: IMF staff estimates based on International Financing Review, Euroweek, Financial Times, and OECD. 
Notes 
This paper was prepared for discussion a t  the study group on Latin 
American Capital Flows, The Group of Thirty. The authors would like to  
thank Guillermo A. Calvo for insightful discussions and previous joint 
work that is reflected in the present paper. Leonardo 1,eiderman is at The 
Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University, and Carmen 
Reinhart is a t  the Research Department, International Monetary Fund. 
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily 
represent those of the Fund. 
Exceptions among our sample are Bolivia, Brazil, and Ecuador; the last 
of these has only experie~lced a very modest improvement in its capital 
account. 
"or example, both Chile and Mexico have posted increases in investment 
during 1990-92. More recently, there are early signs that investment is 
rising in countries like Argentina and Colombia. 
Very disparate initial conditions in excess capacity between the two 
regions may help explain why investment surges in Asia and not in Latin 
America. Most Asian countries enter the capital inflow episode closer to  
full capacity utilization than their Latin American counterparts (an 
exception is Chile), where growth had been sluggish or nonexistent. 
For example, it  is estimated that the assets of pension funds and life and 
cssualty insurance companies reached $5.6 trillion in 1992. 
O n  various aspects of exchange rate bands in Chile and Mexico, see 
Helpman, Leiderrnan, and Bufrnan ( 1993). 
In addition, to  the extent that it reduces the government's need to  issue 
debt, a tighter fiscal stance is also likely to  lower domestic interest rates. 
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